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Abstract 
 
In order to lay the foundation for the study of supply chain power, we study power 
configurations at the level of interlocking power dyads (IPDs), viewing the simultaneous effect 
of upstream and downstream power. We build on four key constructs: dependence asymmetry 
(resource dependence theory), joint dependence (embeddedness perspective), power type 
differential (based on French and Raven, 1959) and power source asymmetry. We examine the 
research question of what the relationship is between IPDs and the focal firm’s operational 
performance, developing hypotheses based on the dependence asymmetry, joint dependence, 
power type differential and power source asymmetry of theoretical IPDs. A survey of over 600 
respondents in China was used to collect data on focal firm perceptions of upstream and 
downstream power, with cluster analysis yielding eight IPDs. Inferential analysis revealed the 
importance of joint dependence, dependence asymmetry, power type differential and power 
source asymmetry to the operational performance of the focal firm. 
INTRODUCTION 
Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man’s character, give him power – 
Abraham Lincoln 
The measure of a man is what he does with power – Plato 
_________________________________________________________________________________
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 What is the role of power in a supply chain?  Although power between individuals has 
been the topic of study for centuries, power relationships also exist between firms in a supply 
chain: “Power is at the heart of all business-to-business relationships (Cox, 2001, p. 10).”  The 
question, then, is which firms benefit from supply chain power. 
The traditional interorganizational perspective builds upon resource dependence theory 
(RDT) (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Because it views a firm as dependent on its external 
environment for resources to ensure its survival, RDT views power as control over valued 
resources. A supply chain member is vulnerable to the extent that it depends on other firms for 
resources that are important to its outcomes. Because of this dependence asymmetry, RDT 
assumes that the more powerful firm activates its power to serve its own interests, to the 
detriment of the other firm. In contrast, the embeddedness perspective (Granovetter, 1985) 
focuses on the total amount of power in a relationship, regardless of the symmetry with which it 
is distributed. Even in the presence of dependence asymmetry, joint dependence has been 
associated with positive outcomes for both firms because they recognize the importance of 
cooperating in order to mutually benefit (Ireland & Webb, 2007).  
This seeming paradox can be resolved by considering several additional factors relevant 
to supply chain power. First, a firm is subject to power from other firms in both its upstream and 
downstream supply chain. If it faces power with detrimental implications from one direction, 
there may be compensating beneficial effects of power from the other direction. Thus, it is 
important to consider source power asymmetry. Second, power is not a unidimensional 
construct; there is the possibility that different types of power may counterbalance each other. 
We propose that different types of supply chain power exist simultaneously in configurations, 
based on the seminal work of French and Raven (1959), which suggests that passive power types 
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have a beneficial effect, while activated power types are more manipulative and can have a 
detrimental effect.  
Therefore, our research question is: What is the relationship between upstream and 
downstream power configurations and operational performance? We synthesize the RDT and 
embeddedness perspectives by constructing interlocking power dyads (IPDs) to tease out key 
characteristics of supply chain power, including the effect of activated vs. passive power types 
and positive vs. negative power types on the operational performance of the focal firm. 
 We begin by examining the dependence asymmetry perspective described by RDT. We 
then develop the embeddedness perspective, focusing on joint dependence. To these, we add 
power type differential, based on French and Raven (1959), and power source asymmetry. 
Building upon dependence asymmetry, joint dependence, power type differential and power 
source asymmetry, we develop hypotheses about the relationship between theoretical IPDs and 
operational performance of the focal firm. Cluster analysis is used to identify IPDs that exist in a 
set of survey data from 617 Chinese manufacturers, and their relationship to the focal firm’s 
operational performance is tested using ANOVA. 
 This research contributes to the literature on supply chain power by establishing IPDs 
that simultaneously consider dependence asymmetry, joint dependence, power type differential 
and power source asymmetry. It serves as a first step towards identifying a firm’s supply chain 
power position and provides a building block for beginning to understand the role of power in a 
complex supply network. 
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POWER IN SUPPLY CHAINS 
The Power Construct 
Power, which is the ability to influence the behavior of another (He, et al., 2013; Drea, et al., 
1993), is the foundation of relationships between people or firms (Dapiran & Hogarth-Scott, 
2003), including firms in a supply chain. It can be intentionally activated or have an effect 
simply because of the knowledge that it exists (Ireland & Webb, 2007). For example, Firm A 
may be proud to be a supplier to Firm B, which is large and very well known. A’s decisions are 
influenced by B, even though B does not intentionally activate its power. Thus, power is a 
perceptual construct (Fiol, et al., 2001) that exists in the eyes of the firm that is influenced.  
         Prior supply chain power research is primarily at the level of dyads. A dyad is a pair of 
nodes and the link that connects them (Choi & Wu, 2009), serving as a building block that 
provides a simplified relationship for study (Benton & Maloni, 2005). Understanding power in 
supply chain dyads is a first step towards understanding it in complex supply networks, 
comprised of linked dyads that may be governed by different power relationships (Watson, 
2001). For example, Bastl, et al (2013) describe coalitions that form when a weaker supply chain 
member aligns with another to form a triad. We extend dyadic analysis to interlocking power 
dyads (IPDs)s, examining a focal firm’s perception of how it is simultaneously influenced by 
upstream and downstream dyads.  
Two Approaches to Understanding Supply Chain Power 
The bulk of the power literature is based on the perspective of resource dependence 
theory (RDT) (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), which describes power as dependence asymmetry, 
intentionally activated, with negative implications. This literature focuses on how a firm can 
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benefit from being in a position of power (Gulati & Sytch, 2007) and how a less powerful firm 
can restructure its dependence (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005).  
In contrast, the embeddedness perspective (Granovetter, 1985) describes power from the 
perspective of joint dependence, which is the total amount of power in a relationship, regardless 
of its distribution. According to this perspective, firms willingly cooperate because of a 
relationship’s mutual benefits, and there is a mix of activated and passive power, with positive 
implications for both firms. This literature focuses on how firms can increase their level of joint 
dependence, while simultaneously managing the uncertainty associated with their dependence 
asymmetry (Yan & Nair, 2016). These approaches provide two different perspectives of the way 
supply chain power is related to operational performance (Figure 1), described below.  
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
RDT Perspective. Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) casts power as 
dependency asymmetry (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Hofer, 2015). Firm A’s dependence on B is 
proportional to A’s need for resources that B can provide and inversely proportional to the 
availability of alternative sources for them. If the net result is negative, A has a dependence 
advantage (power) (Emerson, 1962). On the other hand, if the net result is positive, A has a 
dependence disadvantage (Hofer, 2015). Thus, dependence asymmetry is the difference in power 
between firms in a dyadic relationship.  
A firm increases control to the extent that it furnishes resources that are more critical and 
scarce (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978); thus, RDT views power as control of valued resources. 
Strategies used by a dependence advantaged firm include adversarial tactics (Gassenheimer & 
Ramsey, 1994), requiring transaction-specific investments (Jap & Ganeson, 2000), dictating 
relationship terms (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005) and exerting power during negotiations (Crook 
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& Combs, 2007). From the perspective of the dependence disadvantaged firm, compliance  
represents loss of discretion (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), as it accedes to the wishes of the other 
firm (Touboulic, et al., 2014). To compensate for this, RDT prescribes restructuring dependence 
through uncertainty reduction or seeking more stable access to resources (Casciaro & Piskorski, 
2005). Thus, RDT assumes that power is intentionally activated to influence another firm 
(Pfeffer, 1997). Further, it assumes that power activation has negative implications for the other 
firm.  
 Dependence asymmetry is associated with instrumental relationship commitment, based 
on compliance with extrinsic rewards or punishment (Brown, et al., 1995; Zhao, et al., 2008). 
Each firm instrumentally calculates the costs and benefits of participating in a relationship, 
viewing it as severable if its costs outweigh the benefits. In a supply chain, upstream and 
downstream power may influence a firm differently; thus, it is important to consider dependence 
asymmetry in terms of its source. Therefore, we consider dependence asymmetry (difference 
between customer or supplier power and focal firm power) and source asymmetry (difference 
between customer and supplier power) as separate dimensions of supply chain power. 
Embeddedness Perspective. Emerson’s (1962) foundation for the study of power described a 
second dimension, in addition to dependence asymmetry. Joint dependence is the sum of dyadic 
firms’ dependence, independent of dependence asymmetry. This perspective reflects March’s 
(1966) force depletion model, which views a relationship as having a fixed stock of power. Joint 
dependence, then, is the total stock of power in a relationship, while dependence asymmetry is its 
allocation between firms. An asymmetric dependence relationship can be characterized by 
varying levels of joint dependence and vice versa, thus, both dimensions should be considered 
simultaneously (Hofer, 2015). Emerson (1962) illustrates this with the example of a pair of 
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criminals on the run versus casual acquaintances. Each relationship could fall anywhere on a 
continuum between symmetric and asymmetric dependence; however, joint dependence is much 
higher for the criminals, whose escape depends on their ability to work together.  
The logic of embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985) describes the symbiotic coexistence 
(Dyer, 2000) of joint dependence. Knowledge that the relationship will continue causes the firms 
to be more willing to work together (Hofer, 2015), even though one may hold a dependence 
advantage. Through their interaction, the firms become better acquainted (Nielson, 1996); as the 
positive actions of one firm are reciprocated, both come to perceive the relationship as rewarding 
(Hofer, 2015). Through this process, the firms develop cooperative norms that help govern the 
relationship (Hofer, 2015; Cai & Young, 2008) and function as “moral controls” against 
opportunism (Joshi & Campbell, 2003).  
Joint dependence is associated with normative relationship commitment, which is 
willingness to secure and maintain a relationship, based on identification and internalization of 
common norms and values (Brown, et al., 1995; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Wetzels, et al., 1998; 
Zhao, et al., 2008). It is associated with long-term orientation, effective conflict resolution and 
willingness to forego immediate self-interest for the benefit of the relationship (Gulati & Sytch, 
2007). It results in increased levels of joint action, fine-grained information exchange and trust 
(Gulati & Sytch, 2007), described below, which serve as valuable resources for both firms.  
Joint action is manifest in activities related to product design, cost control, quality 
improvement and bilateral development of solutions. Through joint action (Zaheer & 
Venkatraman, 1995), firms develop shared understanding of the usefulness of mutually 
beneficial behavior (Lawler, et al., 2000). Joint action increases identification between firms 
(Mizruchi, 1989), as each focuses on the other’s responses and attitude, which leads to empathy 
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and internalization of each other’s values (Gulati & Sytch, 2007), structural and attitudinal 
convergence (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and consonance through joint language and shared 
emotions (Czinkota, et al., 2014). Consonance leads to resonance, through a “relational 
evolution,” through which firms create opportunities to achieve common goals (Czinkota, et al., 
2014).  
Fine-grained information exchange about customer demand, sales forecasts, order status, 
inventory levels, capacity availability, lead times, quality and other topics is important to joint 
action (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). As both firms recognize its benefits, the incentive to share 
information increases, making firms less inclined to withhold information for their own use 
(Provan, 1993), and facilitating the efficiency of information exchange (Di Maggio & Powell, 
1983). Joint dependence facilitates distribution of information to the firms where it will have the 
best outcomes (Huber, 2001), providing strategic benefits. Thus, fine-grained information 
exchange channels the vision, strategies and practices of both firms into the same direction (Hult, 
et al., 2004).  
Trust is the expectation that a firm can be relied upon to fulfill obligations, behave 
predictably and act fairly, even if the temptation for opportunism is present (Zaheer, et al., 1995). 
It induces reciprocal acts of trust, fostering greater mutual trust, reducing the need for other 
safeguards and supporting deeper joint action and fine-grained information exchange. In this 
way, joint action, fine-grained information exchange and trust provide resources that benefit both 
firms. 
Power Types 
 
 In addition to dependence asymmetry, power source asymmetry and joint dependence, 
we propose that the configuration of power types is important in supply chain power 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
relationships. While some firms display overall unity of several types of power, others focus on 
specialized types of power (March, 1966). We employ French and Raven’s (1959) seminal 
typology to describe different types of power, summarized in Table 1, then describe how they 
function within configurations.  
Insert Table 1 Approximately Here 
Power types can be grouped by their need for activation. Activated power types are 
characterized by conscious, intentional use (Pfeffer, 1997; March, 1966), to support a desired 
outcome. They provide resources for a dependence disadvantaged firm, on the condition that it 
does as the more powerful firm wishes (Ke et al., 2009); thus they capitalize on dependency 
asymmetry. There are two types of activated power. Reward power is provision of a positive 
outcome, in exchange for desired behavior. Coercive power is the willingness to inflict negative 
consequences for non-compliance (Kumar, et al., 1995; Gundlach & Cadotte, 1994). 
In contrast, passive power is possessed, rather than intentionally activated (Ke, et al., 
2009; Brown, et al., 1995). It is based on a firm’s perceptions of another firm’s power; thus, it is 
perceived as intrinsic to the other firm. There are three types of passive power. Expert power 
results from attribution of expertise to another firm (Branyi & Jozsa, 2015). Although 
information power is sometimes included as a type of passive power, the difference between 
expert power and information power is subtle (Ke, et al., 2009). Referent power comes from the 
desire to identify with and be similar to a highly esteemed firm (Frost & Stahelski, 1988; Raven, 
et al., 1998; Czinkota, et al., 2014). Legitimate power stems from the internalized value that a 
firm is obligated to accept another firm’s influence (Pfeffer, 1997; Sullivan & O’Connor, 1985).  
These types of power exist within a configuration, potentially supporting or 
counterbalancing each other. We propose that power type differential (difference between the 
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strongest and weakest type of power in a configuration), should be considered in the study of 
supply chain power, in addition to joint dependence, dependence asymmetry and power source 
asymmetry. 
HYPOTHESES 
We developed interlocking power dyads (IPDs), to help examine power relationships in a 
complex supply network. An IPD consists of an upstream dyad and a downstream dyad, with a 
focal firm at the intersection point. Figure 2 describes IPD archetypes in terms of their 
dependence asymmetry, joint dependence and power type differential. Because a focal firm’s 
upstream and downstream dyads are not necessarily mirror images, we also included power 
source differential. We do not expect that all theoretical IPD archetypes will exist within a 
specific set of data, since there is a large number possible. 
Insert Table 2 Approximately Here 
 We begin by examining dependence asymmetry and joint dependence, holding power 
type differential and power source asymmetry constant, and their relationship to the focal firm’s 
operational performance. RDT suggests that dependence asymmetry is inversely related to the 
focal firm’s operational performance, due to the more powerful firm’s control of resources 
needed by the focal firm; the focal firm’s operational performance suffers when it must act in the 
interests of the more powerful firm, rather than its own. For example, the focal firm may be 
forced to comply with non-optimal lot sizing and scheduling decisions or function without 
information resources that are important to its operations. Although these decisions benefit the 
more powerful firm, they are detrimental to the focal firm’s operational performance. Because of 
dependence asymmetry, neither firm has an incentive for joint action, since each seeks to protect 
its own resources. Similarly, fine-grained information exchange will be low; the more powerful 
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firm will share only what it believes is necessary to the advancement of its own interests, while 
the focal firm fears that any information that it provides may be used against its interests. As the 
focal firm sees its operational performance deteriorate through association with the more 
powerful firm, trust is reduced. Thus, the more powerful firm’s control of critical resources is 
detrimental to the focal firm’s operational performance.  
 However, joint dependence is expected to be positively related to the focal firm’s 
operational performance; dyadic firms benefit by working together, just as criminals on the run 
do in Emerson’s (1962) example. Their symbiotic coexistence (Dyer, 2000) is underscored by 
knowledge that withholding important resources could jeopardize both firms’ performance 
(Lusch & Brown, 1982), casting the “shadow of the future” (Heide & Miner, 1992) on their 
actions. High joint dependence is positively related to joint action and fine-grained information 
exchange, as both firms develop cooperative norms (Hofer, 2015), increase identification with 
each other (Brown,et al., 1995), develop bilateral solutions to operational problems (Zaheer & 
Venkatraman, 1995) and exchange detailed information about operational decisions (Gulati & 
Sytch, 2007; Hult, et al., 2004). Trust develops as each firm demonstrates that it is honest, 
reliable and stands by its word (Yu & Liao, 2008), helping the focal firm improve its processes 
through compliance with beneficial upstream and downstream influences.  
 We describe the archetype with high dependence asymmetry and joint dependence, 
combined with low power type differential and source asymmetry, as a strong across-the-board 
IPD (see Table 2). High joint dependence functions as a moral control against opportunism 
(Joshi & Campbell, 2003), due to recognition that withholding valuable resources can jeopardize 
both firms’ performance (Lusch & Brown, 1982). Thus, upstream and downstream beneficence 
is ensured by high joint dependence, despite high dependence asymmetry. This is exhibited in 
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joint problem solving, sharing process information and knowledge, and cooperative operational 
decision making, which are positively associated with the focal firm’s operational performance. 
This leads to our first hypothesis:  
H1a:  Strong across-the-board power IPDs are more strongly related to the focal firm’s 
operational performance than moderate or weak across-the-board power IPDs. 
 
In the moderate across-the-board IPD, joint dependence and dependence asymmetry are at a 
medium level, as are all of the power types. There is less joint action and fine-grained 
information exchange than in the strong across-the-board IPD, with a correspondingly smaller 
impact on operational performance. The operational benefits are similar to the strong across-the-
board IPD, but at a somewhat lower level. In the weak across-the-board IPD, dependence 
asymmetry and joint dependence are at the lowest levels of all IPDs; neither the customer, 
supplier nor focal firm have much power, thus, we expect a weak relationship between this 
archetype and the focal firm’s operational performance. Thus, 
H1b:  Moderate across-the-board power IPDs are more strongly related to the focal 
firm’s operational performance than weak across the board power IPDs. 
 
The role of power type differential is illustrated through archetypes related to power 
activation and power valence. While some power types constrain the focal firm’s operating 
decisions through withholding important resources, other types have a counterbalancing effect, 
supporting the focal firm’s operational decisions. Power activation reflects “…whether the 
source does or does not control the reinforcement which guides the target’s behavior (Tedeschi, 
et al., 1972, p. 292)” to support desired outcomes (Pfeffer, 1997) that benefit the more powerful 
firm. If their interests are not aligned, the focal firm’s operational performance will suffer when it 
acts in the interests of the more powerful firm, rather than its own. There is little joint action or 
fine-grained information exchange, as both firms strive to protect their own interests and 
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information exchange is constrained towards the interests of the more powerful firm. Because 
this archetype is characterized by relatively high power type differential and low source 
asymmetry (Table 2), the focal firm is subject to the detrimental effects of reward and coercive 
power that damage relational norms, cooperation (Skinner, et al., 1992) and relationship strength 
(Ke, et al., 2009; Benton & Maloni, 2005; Maloni & Benton, 2000).  
In the strong activated power IPD, the high power type differential is weighted towards 
activated power, which is inversely related to the focal firm’s operational performance, as 
described above. Both the strong and medium activated power IPDs have medium dependence 
asymmetry, thus, the more powerful firm will attempt to activate its reward and coercive power 
to constrain the focal firm’s operational decisions to its own benefit. For example, a customer 
may threaten to withdraw its business if the focal firm does not deliver in certain lot sizes, or a 
supplier may supply the focal firm at a better price in exchange for a longer lead time. Both 
undesirable lot sizes and longer lead times are detrimental to the focal firm’s operational 
performance. However, joint dependence is higher for the moderate activated power IPD, since it 
has a higher stock of all types of power. By providing the focal firm with resources that help 
improve its processes (expert power) that the focal firm willingly accepts, due to its 
identification with (referent power) and/or obligation to (legitimate power) the more powerful 
firm, the focal firm improves its operations in ways that compensate for the detrimental effects of 
activated power. For example, the focal firm may develop a flexible process that can more 
readily accommodate customers’ varying lot size requests and suppliers’ varying lead times. 
Thus,  
 
 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
H2a:  Strong activated power IPDs are more strongly inversely related to the focal 
firm’s operational performance than moderate or weak activated power IPDs. 
 
In contrast, in the low activated power IPD, joint dependence is lower, so there is less 
counterbalancing; however, there is less need for counterbalancing because of the low 
dependence asymmetry. The more powerful firm has less ability to withhold resources that are 
important to the focal firm’s operational performance. Although the power type differential is 
weighted towards activated power, it is only at a medium level. Thus,  
H2b:  Moderate activated power IPDs are more strongly inversely related to the focal 
firm’s operational performance than weak activated power IPDs. 
 
In contrast, passive power’s impact comes from its possession, rather than intentional 
activation. Passive power is associated with a positive focal firm attitude towards the relationship 
(Frazier & Summers, 1986), leading to identification with and internalization of the more 
powerful firm’s norms and values, which support joint action, fine-grained information exchange 
and trust. As trust increases, the focal firm becomes more open to the other firm’s influence, 
benefitting from expertise, joint action and information exchange fostered by referent and 
legitimate power. In the strong passive power IPD, power type differential is high and weighted 
towards the beneficial effect of passive power. Dependence asymmetry is at an intermediate 
level, but because of the high passive power types, this IPD is positively related with the focal 
firm’s operational performance. In the moderate passive power IPD, joint dependence is higher 
than in the strong passive power IPD; however, the power type differential is less. The 
detrimental effect of the activated power types is stronger; thus, the beneficial effects of passive 
power are somewhat tempered by the detrimental effects of activated power, despite higher joint 
dependence. Although the focal firm has some operational benefit from joint action and 
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information exchange, the more powerful firm will try to bias the focal firm’s operational 
decisions to its own benefit. Thus,  
H3a:  Strong passive power IPDs are more strongly related to the focal firm’s 
operational performance than moderate or weak passive power IPDs. 
 
In the weak passive power IPD, joint dependence and dependence asymmetry are lower. 
We do not expect much detrimental activation of reward and coercive power because of the low 
level of dependence asymmetry; the more powerful firm’s power is not much greater than that of 
the focal firm. Thus, this IPD is expected to have a low relationship to the focal firm’s 
operational performance.  
H3b:  Moderate passive power IPDs are more strongly related to the focal firm’s 
operational performance than weak passive power IPDs. 
 
A second way of examining power type differential is through archetypes related to 
power valence, ignoring activation intentionality in favor of outcomes. Although reward power is 
characterized by intentional activation, it can be beneficial to the focal firm through the rewards 
it provides. Reward, expert, referent and legitimate power are all positive power types. On the 
other hand, coercive power can undermine the focal firm’s ability to create resources (Touboulic, 
et al., 2014); thus it has a negative effect that can extend upstream and downstream to the entire 
supply chain. In this way, coercive power can block a focal firm’s ability to perform critical 
functions that contribute to relationship stability (Gundlach & Cadotte, 1994).  
 In the strong negative power IPD, power type differential is high and weighted towards 
negative power. Dependence asymmetry and joint dependence are low, so the detrimental effect 
of this weighting is expected to dominate, with little counterbalancing by positive power types. 
Because of the low source asymmetry, the focal firm faces negative power from both upstream 
and downstream. For example, the more powerful firm may threaten to reduce or withdraw 
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business or spread negative word-of-mouth about the focal firm unless it complies with its 
requests, no matter what their impact on the focal firm’s operations. Because of its desire to 
avoid such outcomes, the focal firm complies with the more powerful firm’s requests, to the 
detriment of its operational performance. In the moderate negative power IPD, power type 
differential, dependence asymmetry and joint dependence are at a medium level. The more 
powerful firm will still try to capitalize on its power; however, the total amount of power that it 
has is less than in the strong negative power IPD. Like the other IPDs, the level of power is low 
in the weak negative power IPD, so there is only a weak relationship between it and the focal 
firm’s operational performance. We posit that: 
H4a:  Strong negative power IPDs are more strongly inversely related to the focal firm’s 
operational performance than moderate or weak negative power IPDs. 
 
H4b:  Moderate negative power IPDs are more strongly inversely related to the focal 
firm’s operational performance than weak negative power IPDs. 
 
In contrast, although power type differential is high or medium in the positive power 
IPDs, it is weighted towards power types that are positively related to the focal firm’s operational 
performance. Positive power types are associated with effective coordination, efficient exchange 
(Hofer, 2015), increased empathy, reduced manipulation, non-adversarial engagement (Gundlach 
& Cadotte, 1994), and less frequent conflict (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). They are positively related 
to the focal firm’s operational performance through learning, information exchange and 
constructive problem solving. Because source asymmetry is low, the focal firm is supported by 
beneficial relationships with both upstream and downstream firms. In the strong positive power 
IPD, power type differential is high and weighted toward positive power types. Although 
dependence asymmetry is also high, it is beneficial, because of the weighting toward positive 
power types. Therefore, 
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H5a: Strong positive power IPDs are more strongly related to the focal firm’s 
operational performance than moderate or weak positive power IPDs. 
 
 In the moderate positive power IPD, the power type differential is less, increasing the 
detrimental effect of coercive power; the more powerful firm will attempt to coerce the focal 
firm to make operational decisions that benefit it. However, the focal firm’s operational 
performance will be relatively strong, due to the benefits of high joint dependence. In contrast, 
the weak positive power IPD will have lower operational performance because of its lower joint 
dependence. Thus, 
H5b: Moderate positive power IPDs are more strongly related to the focal firm’s 
operational performance than weak positive power IPDs. 
 
The final two sets of hypotheses test the effect of power source asymmetry, where the 
balance of power is weighted in favor of the customer or supplier. We focus on the archetypes 
where the asymmetry is the greatest, which are the across-the-board source asymmetric IPDs, 
although many others are possible. In a supplier dominant IPD, the supplier’s across-the-board 
power is high relative to both the focal firm (high dependence asymmetry) and the customer 
(high power source differential). This gives the supplier isolating mechanisms (Cox, 2001) which 
allow it to exploit the focal firm (Maloni & Benton, 2000) by driving operational benefits and 
resources to itself (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Kim, et al., 2006). The focal firm may be reluctant 
to collaborate, fearing that overreliance on the supplier will lead to a “treadmill to oblivion” 
(Touboulic, et al., 2011) that will cause it to make continuing investments with diminishing 
returns. In the strong supplier dominant IPD, dependence asymmetry and power source 
asymmetry are high, so the focal firm is dependence disadvantaged with respect to the supplier. 
Joint dependence is at a moderate level, since dependence is high upstream and low downstream. 
Because type differential is low, little counterbalancing is expected. Thus,  
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H6a: Strong supplier dominant IPDs are more negatively related to the focal 
firm’s operational performance than moderate or weak supplier dominant 
IPDs. 
 
On the other hand, in a moderate supplier dominant IPD, the source differential is less 
and joint dependence is higher; a relatively positive relationship with the customer may provide 
some support to the focal firm to counterbalance the detrimental supplier relationship. In the 
weak supplier dominant IPD, the customer has very little power with which to counterbalance 
the supplier’s power, however, the supplier has only a moderate level of power. Thus, 
H6b: Moderate supplier dominant IPDs are more negatively related to the focal 
firm’s operational performance than weak supplier dominant IPDs. 
 
In contrast, in a customer dominant IPD, source asymmetry is high, but in favor of the 
customer. The customer may influence the focal firm’s behavior and employ adversarial tactics 
because it has little fear of retaliation (Ireland & Webb, 2007; Dore, 1983). Overall, however, 
customer dominance is well aligned with the focal firm’s operational goals (Watson, 2001) 
related to customer satisfaction, and the focal firm may view a customer dominant IPD as a win-
win (Shi, et al., 2013) because of the attractiveness of the customer’s account (Cox, 2004) and 
the resources it can provide. Thus,  
H7: Customer dominant IPDs are positively related to the focal firm’s operational 
performance. 
 
In the strong customer dominant IPD, high power source asymmetry and high dependence 
asymmetry combine with moderate joint dependence to have a positive impact on the focal 
firm’s operational performance. Because power type differential is low, the beneficial effects of 
the customer’s passive power counterbalance the detrimental effects of its activated power. Thus, 
H7a: Strong customer dominant IPDs are more strongly related to the focal firm’s 
operational performance than moderate or weak customer dominant IPDs. 
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In the weak customer dominant IPD, power source asymmetry is lower, thus, the focal firm 
is somewhat subject to both upstream and downstream influence. This influence is positive 
because of the lower power type differential. Thus,  
H7b: Moderate customer dependence advantage IPDs are more strongly related to 
the focal firm’s operational performance than weak customer dominant 
IPDs. 
 
METHOD 
 
A survey instrument was developed to measure the focal firm’s perceptions of upstream 
and downstream power and operational performance. Respondents were asked to focus on their 
firm’s major customer (buys the highest dollar value of its products) and major supplier (supplies 
it with the highest dollar value of supplies), based on the approach used by Fynes and Voss 
(2002), Fynes et al. (2005), Morgan and Hunt (1994), Zhao, et al. (2011) and Brown et al. (1995).  
All measures (Appendix A) used a Likert-type response scale (1=strongly disagree to 
7=strongly agree). The power type measures were adapted from Brown et al. (1995) and 
previously used by Zhao et al. (2008). The measures for operational performance were adapted 
from Frohlich and Westbrook (2002), Beamon (1999), and Vickery et al. (2003), and previously 
used by Flynn, et al. (2010). The questionnaire was developed in English, translated into Chinese 
by an expert, then back-translated into English by a different expert and checked against the 
original English version for discrepancies. The questionnaire was pilot tested with a sample of 
managers in 15 firms.  
The key informant approach was used to identify appropriate respondents. The pilot 
study indicated that there were respondents who were reliable and knowledgeable about both 
upstream and downstream supply chain relationship management, with job titles such as a supply 
chain manager, CEO, president, senior executive, vice president, senior director and senior 
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manager. It also revealed that many of the middle managers had both upstream and downstream 
experience and that the top managers tended to have had multiple functional experiences and a 
broad perspective of the firm’s operations.  
Data were collected in five major cities in China: Chongqing, Tianjin, Guangzhou, 
Shanghai, and Hong Kong. The sampling frame consisted of the China Telecom Yellow Pages in 
the four mainland cities and the Directory of the Chinese Manufacturers Association in Hong 
Kong. One or two firms were randomly selected from each page of the Yellow Pages and the 
Directory, using a random number table. A total of 4,569 firms were contacted by telephone to 
identify potential key informants, who were sent the questionnaire, along with a cover letter 
highlighting the objectives of the research. Follow-up telephone calls were made to improve the 
response rate. One thousand three hundred fifty-six questionnaires were distributed and there 
were 617 usable responses, for a response rate of 45.5%. Most of the respondents had been in 
their position for more than three years (Table 3) and should thus be knowledgeable. Early and 
late responses were compared on physical assets, annual sales and number of employees 
(Armstrong & Overton, 1977), with t-tests revealing no significant differences.  
Insert Table 3 About Here 
Three approaches were used to ensure that the key informants were able to provide valid 
data. First, in the cover letter, we stated: 
The respondent to this questionnaire should have an overall understanding of 
supply chain management. The best persons to answer these questions are the 
President, General Manager and Supply Chain Manager. If you feel that you are 
not the best person to answer certain questions, please ask the person who is the 
most knowledgeable to answer them.  
Second, we compared the responses from the top managers with those from the middle managers, 
in order to assess whether the top managers had the same knowledge about supply chain power 
as the middle managers. Analysis of variance was used to compare their responses on the five 
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types of upstream power, five types of downstream power and operational performance. Of the 
11 tests, the only statistically significant difference was for customer reward power, which the 
top managers perceived as greater than the middle managers. The remaining ten tests were not 
statistically significant. Third, we divided the respondents into those with broad responsibilities 
(supply chain manager, general manager, president, etc.), those with upstream responsibilities 
(purchasing manager, materials manager, etc.) and those with downstream responsibilities (sales 
manager, customer relations manager, etc.). Analysis of variance was employed to test for the 
same differences as the test of upper versus middle managers described above. There were no 
significant differences between the responses of the three groups. Table 4 provides a summary of 
this analysis. Based on these results, we conclude that the respondents were equally capable of 
answering the questions in the survey.  
Insert Table 4 Approximately Here 
The items comprising the power and operational performance measures were not highly 
similar in content, and the respondents were familiar with the constructs. Harman’s one-factor 
test (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986; Podsakoff et al., 2003 Hochwarter et al., 2004;) indicated that 
there were several distinct factors among the power and performance variables. Confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) applied to Harman’s single-factor model (Sanchez & Brock, 1996) 
determined that common method bias was not a problem. To check for normality, P-P plots of 
each variable's cumulative proportion were checked against the cumulative proportion of several 
test distributions, and they were found to be normal. Table 5 indicates that all measures were 
reliable. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) (varimax rotation) assessed unidimensionality. Three 
items, indicated with asterisks in Appendix A, were dropped because their factor loadings were 
relatively low and they loaded on two factors. The final EFA (Appendix B) indicated that all 
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items had strong loadings on the construct they were intended to measure and lower loadings on 
the constructs they were not intended to measure, demonstrating unidimensionality.  
Insert Table 5 Approximately Here 
 
Discriminant and convergent validity were assessed using CFA, where each measurement 
item was linked to its corresponding construct and the covariance among the constructs was 
freely estimated. The model fit indices were Chi-square = 4,930.32 with d.f. = 1517, NNFI = 
0.95, CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.064 and SRMR = 0.049. The model was acceptable (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999), demonstrating convergent validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). A constrained CFA 
model was built for every possible pair of latent constructs, with correlations between the pairs 
fixed at 1.0. It was compared with the original unconstrained model, with freely estimated 
correlations among constructs. Among the 78 Chi-square tests, only three were non-significant, 
demonstrating discriminant validity (Bagozzi, et al., 1991; Chen & Paulraj, 2004; Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981). 
ANALYSIS 
 Cluster analysis was used to classify the respondents, allowing IPDs to emerge. Hierarchical 
clustering procedures determined the best number of clusters, then non-hierarchical clustering 
was applied to produce the final clusters (Hair, et al., 1998). The percentage of change in the 
agglomeration coefficient was the highest and the second highest when the number of clusters 
changed from two to one and from eight to seven, respectively, indicating that two or eight 
clusters would be appropriate. Based on Lehmann’s (1979) guidelines, we used eight, rather than 
two, clusters, and a random sampling of dendrograms confirmed that this represented a good 
solution. Canonical discriminant analysis identified the underlying dimensions that defined the 
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clusters. ANOVA tested the relationship between the IPDs and operational performance. When F 
was significant, Tukey’s b was used to identify specific differences between the IPDs.  
RESULTS 
The cluster analysis results are shown in Tables 6-8 and Figure 2. None of the eight 
emergent IPDs resembled activated power, passive power, negative power or supplier dominant 
theoretical IPDs, thus we tested only H1, H5 and H6 and their sub-hypotheses. Table 7 indicates 
that the first two functions had eigenvalues larger than 1, explaining 87.0% of the variance. 
Between 90.3% and 98.1% of the respondents were correctly classified by the discriminant 
analysis, indicating high predictive ability.  
Insert Table 6-8 and Figure 2 Approximately Here 
 
Table 9 reveals statistically significant differences between operational performWilance for 
the IPDs. All were positively associated with operational performance overall, thus, H1, H5 and 
H6 were supported. The strong across-the-board IPD had operational performance that was 
significantly higher than it was for the moderate or weak across-the-board IPD, supporting H1a. 
Operational performance for the moderate across-the-board IPD was significantly greater than 
for the weak across-the-board IPD, supporting H1b. There was not a significant difference 
between operational performance of the strong positive power IPD and the moderate or low 
positive power IPD, thus, H5a was not supported. The moderate customer dominant and the 
moderate positive power IPDs were almost identical in operational performance, and they were 
both significantly higher than the weak customer dominant and weak non-coercive IPDs, 
respectively, supporting H5b and H6b. Thus, all tested hypotheses and sub-hypotheses were 
supported, with the exception of H6a. 
Insert Table 9 Approximately Here 
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DISCUSSION 
This research examined the relationship between upstream and downstream supply chain 
power configurations and the operational performance of the focal firm at their intersection. It 
contributed to the literature on supply chain power by using interlocking power dyads as the unit 
of analysis. A total of 21 theoretical IPDs was developed, based on dependence asymmetry, joint 
dependence, power type differential and power source asymmetry. Cluster analysis yielded eight 
clusters of upstream and downstream power, corresponding to eight of the theoretical IPDs, 
providing preliminary support for our taxonomy. 
We found that the overall level of power (joint dependence) in an IPD was associated with 
the focal firm’s operational performance, consistent with predictions based on the embeddedness 
perspective. The IPDs with strong levels of power were related to the best levels of operational 
performance, followed by those with moderate levels of power. The IPDs with the weakest joint 
dependence were associated with the lowest levels of the focal firm’s operational performance. 
Thus, joint dependence is positively related to performance. 
The hypotheses allowed testing dependence asymmetry, in addition to joint dependence, 
since the focal firm was dependent on the customer and/or supplier in each of them. Thus, we 
could examine the effect of joint dependence and dependence asymmetry, when considered 
together. This research proposed power type differential as an additional factor in operational 
performance. We found that the across-the-board IPDs had the lowest power type differential, 
since the power types were at equivalent levels, within the configurations. These IPDs were 
associated with the best operational performance, indicating that there is a counterbalancing 
effect between the power types. Although coercive power was at the same level as the other 
power types in these IPDs, the beneficial effects of the other power types led to the best 
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operational performance. Thus, some types of supply chain power have a beneficial effect on the 
focal firm’s performance, compensating for the detrimental effect of other types of power. This 
provides support for the embeddedness perspective and expands the more limited perspective of 
RDT. 
The positive power IPDs had high levels of reward, expert, referent and legitimate power, 
relative to coercive power. There was no difference between the strong positive power IPD’s 
relationship to operational performance and the moderate or weak positive power IPDs’ 
relationship. However, there was a significant difference between the moderate and weak 
positive power IPDs’ relationship to the focal firm’s operational performance. Although reward, 
expert, referent and legitimate power were related to the focal firm’s operational performance, 
they were related at a level that was lower than the across-the-board power IPDs, since the level 
of joint dependence was lower in the positive power IPDs. This provides further support that 
joint dependence is positively related to performance. 
Our findings suggest that there may be a joint dependence threshold, beyond which supply 
chain power becomes important. At lower joint dependence, none of the firms has enough power 
to have much of an impact. At high joint dependence, however, supply chain power is positively 
associated with operational performance. Although the strong across-the-board IPD was 
associated with the best operational performance, it was not significantly different from the 
operational performance for the strong positive power or moderate customer dominant IPDs. 
Thus, dependence asymmetry, power type differential and power source asymmetry are also 
important.  
The customer dominant IPDs were high in power source asymmetry, with strong across-the-
board power downstream and low across-the-board power upstream. This dependence 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
asymmetry was at a somewhat lower level, since only the customer had significant power, 
relative to the focal firm. The moderate customer dominant IPDs were associated with better 
operational performance than the weak customer dominant IPDs. Furthermore, the moderate 
customer dominant and positive power IPDs were related to almost identical operational 
performance. Thus, customer power is more important in the operational performance of the 
focal firm, unlike supplier power. We attribute this to the importance of the customer to many 
aspects of operational performance, including on-time delivery, short lead times, customer 
service, responsiveness to market demand changes and the capability to modify products to meet 
customer needs. Thus, when the customer is powerful, relative to the focal firm, and the supplier 
is not, the focal firm’s attention is directed toward creating resources through its understanding 
of the customer’s needs. This helps improve the focal firm’s operational performance, while 
simultaneously satisfying the customer. In other words, an IPD that contains a relatively weak 
supplier can be just as successful as one with a strong supplier, since a more powerful supplier 
doesn’t help the focal firm create resources; its motives are more likely based on its own needs. 
Combined, the analysis supported all of the hypotheses, except for H5a, which tested the 
relationship between the strong positive IPD and operational performance. They provide support 
for the importance of dependence asymmetry, which was illustrated in all of the strong and 
moderate IPDs; when the focal firm perceives strong or moderate power, the implication is that it 
is more dependent in these relationships. The simultaneous effect of joint dependence is 
supported, since the strong IPDs, which were higher in total power, were related to better 
operational performance than the moderate IPDs, followed by the weak IPDs. Comparison of the 
across-the-board IPDs with the other IPDs supports the importance of power type differential, 
revealing that low power type differential is related to the best performance. Finally, comparing 
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the customer dominant and other IPDs reveals that power source differential is important; 
supplier power is less important to focal firm operational performance than is customer power. 
Thus, the results supported the importance of dependence asymmetry, joint dependence, power 
type differential and power source asymmetry in supply chain power. 
 Dependence asymmetry, joint dependence, power type differential and power source 
asymmetry are relatively easy to understand conceptually, providing a framework for 
understanding power within a segment of a supply chain. This understanding can be expanded by 
applying these constructs in other IPDs, building on Watson’s (2001) notion of power 
subregimes within a supply chain. Specific power subregimes will be different within different 
parts of a supply chain. Understanding IPDs and their relationship with performance is a first 
step towards developing strategies for both dealing with the influence of power and capitalizing 
on it. 
The cluster analysis did not yield an IPD that corresponded to activated vs. passive power. 
Thus, the intentionality of power did not differentiate between operational performance, counter 
to the expectations of the literature. Further, there were no supplier-dominant IPDs that emerged 
from the cluster analysis. There are several possible explanations for this. First, it may be that 
supplier dominance is more unusual than customer dominance. Although there may be powerful 
suppliers of a unique material, for example, this situation is relatively unusual. This finding may 
also be unique to China. Since many large Chinese manufacturers serve as suppliers to large 
multinational firms, they may be particularly sensitive about customer power. Finally, there were 
no negative power IPDs that emerged from the cluster analysis. This supports the importance of 
considering a configuration of power types and not focusing only on coercive power. 
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There are several limitations of this research that lead to opportunities for future research. 
First, although we measured the focal firm’s perceptions of supplier and customer power, we did 
not measure the power or dependence of the focal firm, itself. However, we could infer these 
based on the focal firm’s perceptions of upstream and downstream power; if it perceives a high 
level of power, the focal firm is more dependent by definition. It is certainly conceivable that a 
firm could be weak relative to its customers, but strong relative to its customers, or vice versa. 
Thus, the IPDs that are proposed in this study are only a sampling of the population of IPDs that 
are possible, providing a rich opportunity for future research. Developing a better understanding 
of reciprocal dependence will allow future research to develop a more thorough examination of 
the way power relationships function in the development of resources. Although our measures of 
customer and supplier power were based on the focal firm’s perceptions, we argue that this is the 
best way to measure these constructs, since power is ultimately a perceptual construct that exists 
in the eyes of the influenced firm. 
Second, we used key informants to provide information about both customer and supplier 
power. Although our pilot study indicated that the respondents were well versed about both 
customers and suppliers, and we did not find significant differences between their responses, this 
approach was used, in part, because of anticipated difficulty in obtaining two reliable 
respondents from each firm. Issues associated with the use of a single respondent relate to the 
inability to determine the extent to which variation in a measurement is due to the concept of 
interest, systematic sources of error due to methods factors or random error (Phillips, 1981). 
There is also the potential for informant bias (Kumar, et al., 1993), related to the respondents’ 
positions. To the extent possible, future research should strive to use different informants to 
obtain perceptions of upstream versus downstream relationships. Similarly, although we used 
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RDT to make inferences about resource development, we did not directly measure resources or 
their impact. Future research should build on measurement of resource development and 
possession in complex supply networks. 
Finally, because this research was set in China it may not be generalizable to other national 
cultures. Chinese national culture is particularly strong in power distance (Hofstede, 1983, 1984), 
which is reflected in a strong belief in knowledge and authority. These could impact perceptions 
of expert and legitimate power. Guanxi, which is based on the expectation of mutual favors 
(Zhao, et al., 2008), is an important part of Chinese national culture. This means that there could 
be a greater acceptance of reward power than there would be in other national cultures. Thus, 
replication of this research in other national cultures is important. 
There are numerous opportunities for future research that builds on this study. We applied 
French and Raven’s (1959) theoretical lens to differentiate power types, in conjunction with 
dependence asymmetry, joint dependence and source asymmetry. The resulting IPDs raise a 
number of interesting and important research questions. Because power can be developed by 
doing favors for others (Pfeffer, 1997), the norm of reciprocity may play a role in supply chain 
power (Ireland & Webb, 2007). This suggests extending the unit of analysis from dyads to triads 
of firms and measuring power and dependence of the key supplier, focal firm and key customer. 
At a higher level, the relationship within and between power triads of different types should be 
examined, as a basis for preliminary analysis of power regimes within complex supply networks.  
Although RDT and French and Raven’s (1959) conceptualization of power types provided a 
solid theoretical foundation for this research, there are other theoretical foundations that may also 
be relevant to future research on supply chain power. Information processing theory (Galbraith, 
1973, 1978), which focuses on the uncertainty created by power and mechanisms for uncertainty 
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accommodation and reduction, may be useful in developing strategies for dealing with the 
uncertainties created by power in supply chain relationships. Transaction cost economics theory 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985; Heide & Miner, 1992) may provide deeper insight into the 
opportunistic behavior that can result from dependence asymmetry, particularly in the case of 
investments in transaction-specific assets mandated by a more powerful firm. Institutional theory 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) may contribute to better articulating the pressures that emanate from 
institutional environments to induce a firm to adopt different practices and shared norms. For 
example, violating unwritten rules or norms may bring a firm’s legitimacy into question, 
jeopardizing its access to scarce resources (Ke, et al., 2009; Czinkota, et al., 2014). Drawing 
upon these and other theoretical foundations will help develop a rich theoretical foundation for 
the study of power in complex supply networks. 
This research provides a foundation for understanding the types of power that influence a 
firm in a supply chain. Understanding its current power position is the first step for a firm in 
achieving a competitive advantage within a supply chain (Cox, 2001). The next step is 
development of strategies for moving from its current power position to one that is more 
advantageous. This is complicated by the partial inclusion of a firm in many IPDs and the 
dynamic nature of relationships between supply chain firms (Allport, 1962). Although this 
research contributes to the ability of a supply chain firm to understand its power profile and its 
implications, there are many opportunities for future research to investigate ways in which 
supply chain firms can improve their power position.  
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APPENDIX A 
Construct Measurement 
I.  Power Types (Adapted from Brown, et al., 1995) 
Supplier Power Customer Power 
EXPERT POWER 
The people in our major supplier’s organization know what they are 
doing. 
We usually get good advice from our major supplier. 
Our major supplier has specially trained people who really know what 
has to be done. 
Our major supplier’s business expertise makes it likely to suggest the 
proper thing to do. 
The people in our major customer’s organization know what they are 
doing. 
We usually get good advice from our major customer. 
Our major customer has specially trained people who really know what 
has to be done. 
Our major customer’s business expertise made it likely to suggest the 
proper thing to do. 
REFERENT POWER 
We really admire the way our major supplier runs its business, so we try 
to follow its lead. 
We generally want to operate our company very similar to the way we 
think our major supplier would. 
Our company does what our major supplier wants because we have 
very similar feelings about the way a business should be run. 
*Because our company is proud to be affiliated with its major supplier, 
we often do what it asks. 
We really admire the way our major customer runs its business, so we 
try to follow its lead. 
We generally want to operate our company very similar to the way we 
think our major customer would. 
Our company does what our major customer wants because we have 
very similar feelings about the way a business should be run. 
*Because our company is proud to be affiliated with its major customer, 
we often do what it asks. 
LEGITIMATE POWER 
It is our duty to do as our major supplier requests. 
We have an obligation to do what our major supplier wants, even 
though it isn’t a part of the contract. 
Since it is our major supplier, we accept its recommendations. 
Our major supplier has the right to expect us to go along with its 
requests. 
 
It is our duty to do as our major customer requests. 
We have an obligation to do what the major customer wants, even 
though it isn’t a part of the contract. 
Since it is our major customer, we accept its recommendations. 
Our major customer has the right to expect us to go along with its 
requests. 
REWARD POWER 
If we do not do what as our major supplier asks, we would not have 
received very good treatment from it.  
If we do not do what as our major customer asks, we would not have 
received very good treatment from it.  
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We feel that, by going along with our major supplier, we have been 
favored on some occasions. 
By going along with our major supplier’s requests, we have avoided 
some of the problems other customers face. 
Our major supplier often rewards us, to get our company to go along 
with its wishes. 
We feel that, by going along with our major customer, we have been 
favored on some occasions. 
By going along with our major customer’s requests, we have avoided 
some of the problems other suppliers face. 
Our major customer often rewards us to get our company to go along 
with its wishes. 
COERCIVE POWER 
Our major supplier’s personnel will somehow get back at us if we do not 
do as they ask and they find out. 
Our major supplier often hints that it would take certain actions that 
would reduce our profits if we do not go along with its requests. 
Our major supplier might withdraw certain needed services from us if 
we do not go along with it. 
If our company does not agree to its suggestions, our major supplier 
could make things more difficult for us. 
Our major customer’s personnel would somehow get back at us if we 
do not do as they ask and they find out. 
Our major customer often hints that it would take certain actions that 
would reduce our profits if we do not go along with its requests. 
Our major customer might withdraw certain needed services from us if 
we do not go along with it. 
If our company does not agree to its suggestions, our major customer 
can make things more difficult for us. 
II. Operational Performance (Adapted from Frohlich & Westbrook, 2002; Beamon, 1999; Vickery, et al., 2003) 
Our company can quickly modify products to meet our major customer’s requirements. 
Our company can quickly introduce new products into the markets. 
Our company can quickly respond to changes in market demand. 
Our company has an outstanding on-time delivery record with our major customer. 
Our lead time for fulfilling customers’ orders (the time which elapses between the receipt of customer's order and the delivery of the goods) is 
short. 
Our company provides a high level of customer service to its major customer. 
*Our company’s inventory level is low. 
*Item was deleted based on measurement analysis. 
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APPENDIX B1 
Factor Analysis of Power Types 
 
FACTOR LOADINGS 
 Customer Power  Supplier Power 
 Coercive Legitimate Expert Referent Reward  Coercive Legitimate Expert Referent Reward 
Co2 0.901 0.096 0.012 0.070 0.125 Co2 0.898 0.212 0.017 0.201 0.110 
Co4 0.870 0.106 0.019 0.059 0.143 Co4 0.863 0.226 0.050 0.221 0.120 
Co3 0.862 0.142 0.043 0.024 0.227 Co1 0.846 0.192 0.059 0.204 0.135 
Co1 0.827 0.087 -0.044 0.073 0.204 Co3 0.843 0.166 0.045 0.269 0.099 
Lg1 0.076 0.777 0.238 0.136 0.112 Lg2 0.339 0.807 0.117 0.173 0.204 
Lg2 0.118 0.773 0.115 0.184 0.145 Lg1 0.305 0.793 0.094 0.190 0.278 
Lg3 0.107 0.725 0.215 0.155 0.158 Lg3 0.161 0.756 0.211 0.300 0.134 
Lg4 0.117 0.697 0.118 0.046 0.367 Lg4 0.183 0.609 0.110 0.480 0.185 
Ex2 0.019 0.099 0.806 0.196 0.169 Ex3 -0.005 0.085 0.846 -0.011 0.245 
Ex1 -0.026 0.177 0.787 0.104 0.126 Ex1 0.031 0.094 0.830 -0.044 0.104 
Ex3 -0.102 0.119 0.777 0.271 0.102 Ex2 0.022 0.119 0.761 0.177 0.225 
Ex4 0.160 0.301 0.616 0.164 0.088 Ex4 0.106 0.091 0.594 0.298 0.140 
Rf2 0.099 0.162 0.199 0.858 0.166 Rw2 0.291 0.252 0.111 0.792 0.141 
Rf1 0.062 0.135 0.248 0.826 0.153 Rw3 0.298 0.281 0.205 0.748 0.190 
Rf3 0.067 0.204 0.241 0.799 0.159 Rw4 0.461 0.218 0.019 0.629 0.258 
Rw2 0.212 0.290 0.161 0.151 0.767 Rw1 0.463 0.359 0.107 0.599 0.084 
Rw3 0.186 0.261 0.277 0.158 0.738 Rf2 0.160 0.197 0.297 0.208 0.844 
Rw4 0.347 0.081 0.161 0.220 0.645 Rf1 0.105 0.161 0.361 0.128 0.817 
Rw 0.308 0.439 0.018 0.159 0.589 Rf3 0.205 0.311 0.224 0.177 0.749 
            
Eig. 3.389 2.843 2.675 2.4520 2.357 Eig. 3.936 2.902 2.758 2.745 2.437 
Total Variance Explained = 72.018% Total Variance Explained = 77.84% 
Ex = expert power, Rf = referent power, Lg = legitimate power, Rw = reward power, Co = coercive power. 
  
APPENDIX B2 
Factor Analysis of Operational Performance 
 
 Factor Loading 
OPF1 .808 
OPF3 .801 
OPF4 .785 
OPF5 .771 
OPF6 .749 
OPF2 .719 
Eigenvalue 3.584 
Total variance explained  59.735% 
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TABLE 1 
Types of Supply Chain Power 
 
 Definition Assumptions Supply Chain Examples 
Reward power Source promises positive outcomes 
or removal of negative outcomes 
for the target. 
Source has access to resources 
that are valued by the target. 
 Supplier promises to reduce prices or 
deliver more quickly. 
 Customer promises increase in future 
business or to pay a higher price. 
Coercive power Source threatens to deliver aversive 
outcomes or fail to deliver positive 
outcomes to the target 
Source has access to resources 
that increase the credibility of its 
threats. 
 Supplier threatens to slow down 
shipments or to reduce target’s priority. 
 Customer threatens to withdraw future 
business or exclusive territory rights. 
Expert power Target believes that the source 
knows what is best to do in a 
particular situation, compared to its 
own knowledge or against an 
absolute standard. 
Target believes that source has 
knowledge or expertise that it 
doesn’t possess. 
 Focal firm values supplier’s insights 
about how to use its materials in product 
development 
 Focal firm values customer’s guidance in 
developing a Six Sigma initiative. 
Referent power Target desires to identify with and 
be similar to an esteemed source. 
Target believes that source is 
highly esteemed. 
 Focal firm advertises that it only 
purchases from American suppliers. 
 Focal firm displays plaques featuring the 
names of its well-known customers. 
Legitimate power Target believes that target has 
authority over it, based on its 
organizational role or position. 
Target’s internalized values 
dictate that the source has a 
genuine right to influence it and 
that it is obligated to accept that 
influence. 
 Focal firm feels obligated to purchase 
components from another division of its 
corporation. 
 Focal firm believes that the customer is 
always right. 
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TABLE 2 
Characteristics of Theoretical Interlocking Power Dyads 
 
 Interlocking Power Dyad  
Observed? 
 
Power 
Type 
Differential 
Power 
Source 
Asymmetry 
 
Dependenc
e 
Asymmetry 
 
Joint 
Dependence 
Supplier Power  Customer Power 
Ex Rf Lg Rw Co  Ex Rf Lg Rw Co 
Across-the-Board Power IPDs 
Strong + + + + +  + + + + + Y Low Low High High 
Moderate ● ● ● ● ●  ● ● ● ● ● Y Low Low Medium Medium 
Weak - - - - -  - - - - - Y Low Low Low Low 
Activated Power IPDs 
Strong - - - + +  - - - + + N High Low Medium Medium 
Moderate ● ● ● + +  ● ● ● + + N Medium Low Medium High 
Weak - - - ● ●  - - - ● ● N Medium Low Low Low 
Passive Power IPDs 
Strong + + + - -  + + + - - N High Low Medium Medium 
Moderate + + + ● ●  + + + ● ● N Medium Low High High 
Weak ● ● ● - -  ● ● ● - - N Medium Low Low Low 
Negative Power IPDs 
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 Interlocking Power Dyad  
Observed? 
 
Power 
Type 
Differential 
Power 
Source 
Asymmetry 
 
Dependenc
e 
Asymmetry 
 
Joint 
Dependence 
Supplier Power  Customer Power 
Ex Rf Lg Rw Co  Ex Rf Lg Rw Co 
Strong - - - - +  - - - - + N High Low Low Low 
Moderate ● ● ● ● +  ● ● ● ● + N Medium Low Medium  Medium  
Weak - - - - ●  - - - - ● N Medium Low Low Low 
Positive Power IPDs 
Strong + + + + -  + + + + - Y High Low High High  
Moderate + + + + ●  + + + + ● Y Medium Low High High 
Weak ● ● ● ● -  ● ● ● ● - Y Medium Low Medium Medium  
Supplier Dominant IPDs 
Strong + + + + +  - - - - - N Low High High Medium 
Moderate + + + + +  ● ● ● ● ● N Low Medium High High 
Weak ● ● ● ● ●  - - - - - N Low Medium Medium Low 
Customer Dominant IPDs 
Strong - - - - -  + + + + + N Low High High Medium 
Moderate ● ● ● ● ●  + + + + + Y Low Medium High High 
Weak - - - - -  ● ● ● ● ● Y Low Medium Medium Low 
 
        =  focal firm, + = high, ● = medium, - = low. Ex = expert power, Rf = referent power, Lg = legitimate power, Rw = reward power, Co = coercive power 
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TABLE 3 
Profile of Respondents 
 
Industry %  Sales %  
Arts and crafts 
Building materials 
Chemicals and petrochemicals 
Electronics and electrical 
Food, beverage and alcohol 
Jewelry 
Metal, mechanical and engineering 
Pharmaceutical and medical 
Printing and publishing 
Rubber and plastics 
Textiles and apparel 
Toys 
Wood and furniture 
1.9 
5.0 
6.3 
13.1 
4.9 
0.5 
25.4 
1.8 
4.4 
6.6 
17.8 
1.3 
1.9 
<HK$ 5M 
HK$ 5M to HK$ 10M 
HK$ 10M to HK$ 20M 
HK$ 20 M to HK$ 50M 
HK$ 50M to HK$ 100M 
HK$ 100M or more 
32.4 
14.1 
12.4 
15.8 
10.2 
15.0 
Position %  Years in Current Position %  
Top management 
Middle management 
Other 
39.9 
56.9 
3.2 
1-3 years 
4-6 years 
7-12 years 
More than 12 years 
26.9 
22.9 
24.6 
25.6 
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TABLE 4 
Assessment of Validity of Respondents 
Test of Respondent Level 
 Mean  
F 
 
Significance 
Level 
 Top Managers Middle Managers 
Customer power 
Expert 
 
5.14 
 
5.00 
 
2.63 
 
.11 
Referent 4.52 4.38 1.89 .17 
Legitimate 5.14 4.96 3.66 .06 
Reward 4.55 4.30 6.11 .01 
Coercive 3.74 3.50 3.60 .06 
 
Supplier Power 
Expert 
 
4.74 
 
4.68 
 
.44 
 
.51 
Referent 4.01 3.93 .63 .43 
Legitimate 3.64 3.53 .83 .36 
Reward 3.59 3.50 .62 .43 
Coercive 2.93 2.86 .30 .59 
 
Performance 
Operational 
Performance 
 
5.38 
 
5.34 
 
.27 
 
.61 
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Test of Respondent Position 
 Mean  
F 
 
Significance 
Level 
 Upstream 
Management 
General 
 
Management 
Downstream 
Management 
Customer power 
Expert 
 
4.84 
 
5.06 
 
5.12 
 
.81 
 
.45 
Referent 4.06 4.47 4.33 1.80 .17 
Legitimate 4.71 5.03 5.09 1.34 .26 
Reward 3.98 4.42 4.39 1.98 .14 
Coercive 3.29 3.59 3.64 .61 .54 
 
Supplier power 
Expert 
 
4.71 
 
4.70 
 
4.79 
 
.21 
 
.81 
Referent 3.75 3.98 3.94 .51 .60 
Legitimate 3.31 3.56 3.74 .98 .38 
Reward 3.21 3.54 3.52 .82 .44 
Coercive 2.78 2.90 2.69 .64 .53 
 
Performance 
Operational 
Performance 
 
5.34 
 
5.34 
 
5.37 
 
.03 
 
.97 
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TABLE 5 
Reliability Analysis 
 
 # of items Cronbach’s Alpha 
Customer power   
Expert 4 0.813 
Referent 3 0.875 
Legitimate 4 0.825 
Reward 4 0.831 
Coercive 4 0.915 
   
Supplier power   
Expert 4 0.803 
Referent 3 0.903 
Legitimate 4 0.892 
Reward 4 0.894 
Coercive 4 0.942 
   
Operational performance 6 0.861 
 
 
  
 
 
 
TABLE 6 
Cluster Means 
 
 
Cluste
r 
Customer Power ( ) Supplier Power ( )  
n Expe
rt 
Refer
ent 
Legitim
ate 
Rewa
rd 
Coerc
ive 
Expe
rt 
Refer
ent 
Legitim
ate 
Rewa
rd 
Coerc
ive 
Across-the-board   
Strong 6.04 5.75 6.19 5.92 5.50 5.94 5.89 5.75 5.62 5.10 58 
Moder
ate 
4.96 4.51 5.02 4.69 4.31 4.85 4.53 4.39 4.44 4.15 10
8 
Weak 4.30 3.79 4.38 3.98 3.63 4.20 3.82 3.61 3.63 3.20 15
3 
            
Positive power   
Strong 5.97 6.07 5.47 5.19 2.18 5.77 5.69 4.91 4.82 2.23 32 
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Moder
ate 
5.57 4.69 5.38 3.77 2.05 5.06 3.96 2.72 2.14 1.61 91 
Weak 4.34 3.20 3.73 2.82 1.91 4.02 2.76 2.46 2.37 1.73 62 
            
Customer dominant   
Moder
ate 
5.83 5.18 6.06 5.65 4.73 4.98 4.22 2.99 3.42 2.07 62 
Weak 4.85 3.90 5.09 4.33 4.06 3.71 2.56 1.97 2.07 1.73 51 
F 59.08*
** 
64.26**
* 
65.57*** 99.12*
** 
112.11*
** 
50.94*
** 
99.39**
* 
122.43**
* 
161.92
*** 
154.96*
** 
 
 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 7 
Discriminant Analysis 
 
Function Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative % Canonical Correlation 
1 5.720 69.8 69.8 0.923*** 
2 1.406 17.2 87.0 0.764*** 
3 0.772 9.4 96.4 0.660*** 
4 0.250 3.0 99.4 0.447*** 
5 0.028 0.3 99.8 0.166 
6 0.014 0.2 99.9 0.116 
7 0.004 0.1 100.0 0.064 
*p<0.05   **p<0.01   ***p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8 
Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients 
 
 Function 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Customer power 
Expert .156 .313 .076 .164 .684 -.102 .036 
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Referent .237 .292 -.151 -.068 -.024 -.443 -.152 
Legitimate .111 .413 .220 .484 -.304 -.079 .039 
Reward .235 .086 .233 -.442 -.242 -.141 -.347 
Coercive .317 -.288 .689 -.040 .162 .249 .467 
 
Supplier power 
Expert .104 .168 -.110 .190 .208 .593 -.045 
Referent .353 .219 -.166 .003 -.627 .363 .092 
Legitimate .361 -.169 -.254 .059 .145 -.453 .753 
Reward .316 -.050 -.220 -.665 .303 .228 -.270 
Coercive .368 -.408 -.047 .733 -.079 -.178 -.501 
 
 
 
TABLE 9 
Differences in Operational Performance 
 
 
IPD 
Mean 
Operational 
Performance 
Results of Hypothesis Tests Other 
Significantly 
Different IPDs Hypothesis Supported? 
Strong across-the-
board (SATB) 
6.11 H1a: 
SATB>MATB,WATB 
Yes WCD, WP 
Moderate across-
the-board 
(MATB) 
5.47 H1b: MATB>WATB Yes SP, WP 
Weak across-the-
board (WATB) 
4.87   SP, MP, WCD 
 
Strong 
positive(SP) 
 
6.06 
 
H5a: SP>MP, WP 
 
No 
 
WCD, MATB, 
WATB 
Moderate positive 
(MP) 
5.84 H5b: MP>WP Yes WCD, WATB 
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Weak positive 
(WP) 
5.12   MCD, SATB 
 
Moderate 
customer 
dominant (MCD) 
 
5.83 
 
H6b: MCD>WCD 
 
Yes 
 
WP, WATB 
Weak customer 
dominant (WCD) 
5.04   SP, MPC, 
SATB, MATB 
     
OVERALL 5.43    
F 24.70***    
 
 *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.00 
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